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Johnson v. State of Nevada, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (July 30, 2015)1
CRIMINAL LAW: VALIDITY OF “SHOW-UP” IDENTIFICATIONS
Summary
The Court heard an appeal from a sentence and conviction following a jury trial of one
count of conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of robbery, and one count of battery with intent
to commit a crime. Affirmed.
Background
Christina Raebel and Albert Valdez were walking to a bar in downtown Las Vegas when
they noticed two men following them. Raebel viewed the men directly for about “a second and a
half”2 and Valdez saw them through his peripheral vision for “[o]ne second.”3 Without warning,
the two men, later identified as Tabuta Johnson and his brother, Varian Humes, assaulted and
robbed Raebel and Valdez.
Minutes later, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) officers arrived at the
scene. Raebel and Valdez described the men that had assaulted them and the direction in which
they fled. Based on the description, LVMPD issued a radio broadcast for the two fleeing suspects.
Moments later, patrolling officers saw Johnson and Humes, who fit Raebel and Valdez’s
description “to a tee,”4 three blocks from the crime scene. As the patrolling officers stopped the
men for questioning, they saw Raebel’s purse, car keys, and Vladez’s wallet scattered on the
ground. After handcuffing the two men, the officers found Valdez’s cell phone in Humes’s pocket.
Roughly thirty minutes after the crime, LVMPD officers informed Raebel and Valdez that
they had “found people that matched the description”5 and separately transported them to where
Johnson and Humes were being held. On the way there, the LVMPD officers told Raebel and
Valdez to state if they recognized the people that would be shown to them, and told them that “[a]
person is just as innocent as they are guilty”6 and also, that it was “just as important to free an
innocent man”7 as it was to identify a guilty one. Raebel and Valdez were separated from each
other while LVMPD officers brought out Johnson and Humes, one at a time, and shined spotlights
on them. Raebel immediately recognized both Johnson and Humes with 100 percent certainty.
Valdez recognized Johnson with 90 percent certainty, but did not recognize Humes at all.
Johnson and Humes were charged with various crimes; Humes pled guilty while Johnson
proceeded to trial. During the trial, the jury was informed of the out-of-court “show-up”8
identification during which Johnson was positively identified by both Raebel and Valdez. Raebel
and Valdez also identified Johnson at trial. He was convicted on all counts.
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Following the trial, the State sought to have Johnson adjudicated as a habitual criminal,
submitting six judgments of conviction for prior felonies.9 The court adjudicated Johnson a
habitual criminal and he was sentenced.
Discussion
On appeal, Johnson claimed that the show-up identification was conducted in an
unnecessarily suggestive, and therefore unconstitutional manner. He argued that the district court
should not have admitted the out-of-court testimony or the in-court identification at trial. He also
argued that the court plainly erred in adjudicating him a habitual criminal. Because Johnson raised
both of these issues for the first time on appeal, the Court’s review was narrowly limited to
determine whether plain error had occurred.
The validity of the show-up identification procedures
When a witness testifies that she personally saw a crime as it occurred, and later recognized
the same person she previously saw, she has performed an “identification.” Various methods are
used by the police force to obtain identifications. Regardless of the method employed, the Due
Process Clause of the United States and Nevada Constitutions prohibits criminal prosecution based
on identification procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances. Here, the Court tested
the validity of the show-up identification under a two-part test. It determined “(1) whether the
show-up procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, and (2) whether the identification was
nonetheless reliable in spite of any unnecessary suggestiveness in the identification procedure.”10
The show-up in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive
Determining whether a show-up was unnecessarily suggestive turns upon the particular
circumstances surrounding the identification. Here, Raebel and Valdez were specifically instructed
that it was equally as important that they exonerate an innocent person as it was to identify a guilty
one. Additionally, they were separated during the examination, so as not to influence one another.
The Court found that even if the show-up contained some elements of suggestiveness, strong
countervailing policy considerations existed in this case that justified LVMPD’s show-up
identification, rather than any other method.
The identification was reliable
The Court held that even if the show-up method used here was suggestive, suggestiveness
by itself does not preclude identification testimony at trial in the identification was otherwise
reliable. Reliability is measured by: “(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the
time of the crime, (2) the degree of attention paid by the witness, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s
prior description, (4) the level of the witness’s certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5)
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”11 Here, Raebel testified that she
clearly viewed both suspects prior to the crime and that she had paid special attention because she
sensed that she was being followed. She remained in close proximity to them during the assault.
Valdez testified that his view of the suspects prior to the attack was limited, but that he had more
opportunity to view them during the assault. Furthermore, Raebel and Valdez were asked to
identify the suspects shortly after the attack while the incident was still fresh in their minds. Finally,
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Raebel and Valdez described the suspects exactly before they were apprehended and subsequently
identified. For the foregoing reasons, the Court held that the district court did not plainly err when
it permitted testimony regarding the victims’ identification of Johnson both before and during the
trial.
The district court did not plainly err in adjudicating Johnson a habitual criminal
Johnson argues that the sentencing court incorrectly adjudicated him as a habitual criminal
based only on his perceived escalating violence. However, NRS 207.010 states that a defendant
who has been convicted of three or more felonies qualifies as a habitual criminal.12 The Court cited
Tanksley v. State, which held that adjudication under criminal statutes entails “the broadest kind
of judicial discretion,”13 and found that the statutes do not indicate any express limitations on the
judge’s discretion. Finally, the Court stated that a sentencing court acts correctly so long as it does
not operate “under a misconception of the law regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual
criminal adjudication.”14 Because the record did not demonstrate that the district court was
unaware of the discretion afforded to it, the Court held that the district court properly exercised its
discretion to sentence Johnson as a habitual criminal.
Conclusion
After finding that the district court did not plainly err by admitting the show-up
identification testimony into evidence, nor plainly err in adjudicating Johnson as a habitual
criminal, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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